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1. INTRODUCTION
In Mirrleess (1971) seminal article, migration is supposed to be impossible. However, according
to Mirrlees himself, "since the threat of migration is a major inuence on the degree of progres-
sion in actual tax systems, at any rate outside the United States, this is [an] assumption one
would rather not make". This threat is certainly even more topical after 25 years of increasing
international openness. A rst source of worry in many OECD countries is the departure of some
of their highly skilled individuals for tax havens. It is considered that the US$11.5 trillion of
assets which are held o¤shore worldwide by high net-worth individuals represent a loss in taxes
exceeding US$ 255 billion each year (TRL, 2005). A second source of concern is the challenge
faced by some developed high-tax countries because their neighbours have less redistributive
objectives. For instance, about 34 000 income taxpayers have left France each year since 2000.
These individuals paid three times more taxes than the average taxpayer and 70% of them chose
to relocate to another EU country, like the UK, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, or to North
America (DGI, 2005), mainly to countries where income taxes are lower. This suggests that
international di¤erences in income taxes are one of the determinants of the migration decision.
This motivation for leaving the home country is in accordance with John Hickss idea that mi-
gration decisions are based on the comparison of earnings opportunities across countries, net of
moving costs, which is the cornerstone of practically all modern economic studies of migration
(Sjaastad, 1962, Borjas, 1999).
The mobility of highly skilled individuals for tax purposes induces both losses in taxes and in
productive capacity in the left countries. It di¤ers from the brain drain because its key parameter
is not the change in individual productivity resulting from emigration. Governments have also
a more limited set of instruments than when they face tax evasion (e.g. Chander and Wilde
(1998)). They have indeed few alternatives but to reduce taxes to prevent the departure of
highly skilled individuals: in a nutshell, they can use "carrots" but no "sticks". As a result, a
specic conict arises between the desire to maintain national income per capita in keeping taxes
down and the aim to sustain the redistribution programme. The possibility that highly skilled
individuals vote with their feet with a view to paying lower taxes appears therefore as a new
constraint on the design of the optimal income tax schemes.
This paper studies the optimal non-linear income tax in a Mirrleesian economy ("home coun-
try") the citizens of which have type-dependent outside options consisting in emigrating to a less
redistributive country ("foreign country"). The government wants to redistribute incomes from
the more to the less productive individuals as in Mirrleess (1971) model, but has also to take
account of participation constraints for the individuals it wants to keep at home. The optimal
income tax papers taking individual mobility into account have used models with no leisure-
consumption choice (Mirrlees, 1982, Hindriks, 1999, Osmundsen, 1999), considered a world with
two classes of individuals and lump-sum taxes (Leite-Monteiro, 1997), focused on linear taxes
(Wilson, 1980, 1982, Simula and Trannoy, 2006), or employed Stiglitzs (1982) self-selection ap-
proach with two types of individuals (Huber, 1999, Hamilton and Pestieau, 2005, Piaser, 2003).
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Among them, Leite-Monteiro (1997), Hindriks (1999), Huber (1999) and Piaser (2003) have
adopted the point of view of tax competition. Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) have concentrated
on migration equilibria.
This paper considers optimal non-linear income taxation when there is a continuum of indi-
viduals di¤ering in productivity as well as migration costs and facing consumption-leisure choices
in the absence of unemployment. It examines how the foreign income tax policy inuences the
optimal income tax schedule implemented at home when agents vote with their feet. Since at this
stage we do not want to study the reverse question, the foreign tax policy has to be exogenous
with respect to the policy implemented at home1 . The only coherent case is that in which the
foreign government chooses the laissez-faire. Otherwise, the tax revenue constraint abroad would
usually be slack or violated after the arrival of individuals from the home country, so the income
tax scheme abroad should be adapted2 . In addition, we consider that all individuals are initially
in the home country because we are not interested herein in emigration of low-skilled individuals
to the home country. Finally, we assume that both countries have the same constant-returns-to-
scale production function as we do not want individual productivity to depend on the country
of residence.
The social objective is more complex to specify when individuals are allowed to vote with
their feet because the set of agents whose welfare is to count can depend on the income tax itself.
We distinguish three social criteria. Under the National criterion, the domestic government max-
imizes the average welfare of its citizens whilst ensuring that every citizen lives at home. Under
the Citizen criterion, it maximizes the average welfare of its citizens, irrespective of their country
of residence. Under the Resident criterion, it maximizes the average welfare of its residents.
We consider that an individual chooses to emigrate if his indirect utility at home is lower
than his best outside option. Since many empirical studies have shown that the propensity to
migrate increases with the skill level (Sahota, 1968, Schwartz, 1973, Gordon and McCormick,
1981, Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980, Inoki and Surugan, 1981), it is sensible to assume that
more productive individuals should have more attractive outside options. Consequently, the
reservation utility, i.e. the minimum utility the domestic government should give to keep an
individual at home, should be increasing in productivity. We ensure it is the case by assuming
that the costs of migration, expressed in terms of utility, monotonically depend on productivity
and do not increase faster than the indirect utility in B: Monotonicity of these costs implies that
productivity is in fact the sole parameter of heterogeneity within the population.
Since individuals have type-dependent outside options, As optimal income tax scheme must
satisfy type-dependent participation constraints. We borrow these constraints from contract the-
ory (see Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000))
and introduce them in the optimal non-linear income tax problem à la Mirrlees to examine at
1Studying the interaction between two non-linear income tax countries raises di¢ cult problems. For instance
the revelation principle would generally vanish in A and B (See Page and Monteiro (2003) for non-linear pricing).
2 It should be noted that the main properties derived below remain valid when Bs government implements a
given non-linear income tax schedule. What really matters is that Bs tax policy is given. We only assume that
B is a laissez-faire country for theoretical coherence.
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which productivity levels they should be binding to obtain the highest social welfare from our
three social criteria3 . We have shown in Simula and Trannoy (2006) that linear taxes lack de-
grees of freedom when such constraints are taken into account, which explains why we consider
non-linear taxes herein.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. When each individuals productivity is
public information (rst-best), it is socially optimal to prevent emigration of the highly-skilled
individuals from both Citizen and Resident criteria, which coincide therefore with the National
criterion at the optimum. There is a curse of the middle-skilled workers at the optimum, instead
of the curse of the highly skilled obtained in closed economy (Mirrlees, 1974). Indeed, it is no
longer possible to demand as much work as without mobility from the highly skilled individuals,
so the productive rent is extracted to the maximum from the most productive individuals among
those insu¢ ciently talented to threaten to emigrate. However, these middle-skilled workers
cannot be taxed at will because they would otherwise threaten to emigrate. Consequently, the
redistribution in favour of the low-skilled individuals has to be reduced.
When each individuals productivity is private information (second-best), two qualitative
properties of the optimal marginal tax rates are lost: they can be non-positive at interior points
and strictly negative at the top. Consequently, individual mobility does not only render the tax
schedule less progressive, but can also make the tax function decreasing. In fact, the small tax
reform perturbation around the optimal tax scheme used by Piketty (1997) and Saez (2001) has an
additional participation e¤ect on social welfare, which favours a decrease in the optimal marginal
tax rates even for individuals below the productivity levels where the individuals threaten to
emigrate. This new e¤ect results in changes in Mirrleess (1971) and Diamonds (1998) formulae
to ensure that the optimal average tax rates are compatible with the participation constraints of
the individuals threatening to emigrate. In addition, the interaction between the type-dependent
participation constraints and the incentive compatibility conditions can give rise to countervailing
incentives, in which case less skilled individuals want to mimic more skilled individuals because
the latter have more appealing outside options. Countervailing incentives cause an indirect social
cost of the presence in A of the highly-skilled individuals. The Citizen and Resident criteria
allow us to consider whether it is not too expensive in terms of social welfare to implement a
tax scheme which prevents emigration of the highly skilled workers. When the indirect cost due
to countervailing incentives prevails over the benets of them staying in A, implementing a tax
schedule inducing them to emigrate increases social welfare.
Numerical simulations calibrated with French data are provided to quantify to which extent
individual mobility alters the whole optimal non-linear income tax schedule. They emphasize
that the optimal marginal and average tax rates are signicantly altered even if there are very
few people threatening to emigrate. In particular, the optimal average tax rates can start to
3See Osmundsen (1999) for a direct application of the framework developed by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1995) to a tax problem in a country the individuals of which share their working time between home and abroad.
By construction, this model does not allow to investigate how individual mobility alters the issues raised in the
closed-economy optimal income tax literature.
4
decrease far below the income level from which potential mobility occurs. There is consequently
a second-best curse of the middle-skilled, consisting in them being taxed the most in proportion
to gross income. This curse is even stronger when migration costs are decreasing in productivity:
the optimal income tax schedule is not only less progressive but also such that the highly-skilled
pay taxes lower than the middle-skilled.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 examines the rst-
best optimal allocations. Section 4 studies the properties of the second-best optimal allocations.
Section 5 provides numerical simulations on French data. Section 6 concludes. Most proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The world consists of two countries, A and B. All individuals are initially living in A: A0s
government implements a redistributive tax policy and B is committed to being a laissez-faire
country. The governments provide no public goods. Both countries have the same production
function with constant returns to scale. Hence, productivity levels, equal to wages in the absence
of taxation, are independent of the country in which the individuals are working.
Individuals di¤er in productivity : An individual with productivity  is called a -individual.
The cumulative distribution function of , denoted F; is common knowledge. It is dened on a
closed interval

; 
  R+ where it admits a continuous and strictly positive density f 4 .
2.1. Individual Behaviour
All individuals have the same preferences over consumption x and labour l: If l is the time
endowment, these preferences are represented by a utility function U : X ! R; where X :=
(x; l) 2 R+  [0; l)	 :
Assumption 1. U is a C2 strictly concave function such that Ux > 0; Ul < 0 and U !  1 as
x
>! 0 or l <! l.
Assumption 2. Leisure is a normal good.
A -individual working l units of time has gross income z := l: We call
u (x; z; ) := U (x; z=) (1)
the personalized utility function and note that u0x = U
0
x; u
0
z = U
0
l=; u
00
xx = U
00
xx; u
00
xz = U
00
xl=;
u00zz = U
00
ll=
2: The marginal rate of substitution of gross income for consumption of a -individual
at (x; z) is
s (x; z; ) :=  u
0
z (x; z; )
u0x (x; z; )
: (2)
4Optimization programmes consisting in choosing the socially optimal upper productivity level in A are ad-
dressed below. If  were allowed to be +1; we would have to choose one convergence criterion among the di¤erent
available ones and introduce additional assumptions.
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Each individual decides about the optimal amount of consumption and labour to maximize
his utility subject to his budget constraint. Using a tax function T (; l) ; As government can
arrange that an individual with gross income z has disposable income z   T (; l) in A. Con-
sequently, the utility maximization programme in A, max(x;l)2X fU (x; l) s.t. x = z   T (; l)g ;
denes implicitly the consumption and labour supply functions in A; xA () and lA () respec-
tively5 . The indirect utility in A is
VA () := U (xA () ; lA ()) : (3)
We call eH and eM the Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities of labour supply with respect to the
net-of-tax wage rate. The utility maximization programme inB,max(x;l)2X fU (x; l) s.t. x = zg ;
denes implicitly the consumption and labour supply functions in B, xB () and lB () respec-
tively. The indirect utility in B is
VB () := U (xB () ; lB ()) ; (4)
which is strictly increasing in .
2.2. Emigration and Participation Constraints
An individual leavingA pays a strictly positivemigration cost c. This cost corresponds to a "time-
equivalent" loss in utility, due to di¤erent material and psychic costs of moving: application fees,
transportation of persons and households goods, forgone earnings, costs of speaking a di¤erent
language and adapting to another culture, costs of leaving ones family and friends, etc. "[These
migration] costs probably vary among persons [but] the sign of the correlation between costs and
wages is ambiguous" (Borjas, 1999, p. 12). We consider that they depend on productivity and
that their distribution is known to As government. In addition:
Assumption 3. c :

; 
! R++ is a C2 monotonic function satisfying c0 () < V 0B ().
Monotonicity implies that As government knows c () when it knows : Migration costs are
allowed to be either non-increasing or non-decreasing provided they do not increase faster than
the laissez-faire utility VB : No restrictions are placed on their level.
The reservation utility is the maximum utility an individual staying in A can obtain abroad.
It is thus equal to VB ()   c () : Assumption 3 amounts thus to considering that the outside
opportunities are increasing in productivity. The location rent of a -individual is the excess of
his indirect utility in A over his reservation utility, i.e.
R () = VA ()  VB () + c () : (5)
5 It is assumed that the function x (; l) := z (; l)  T (; l) is upper semi-continuous.
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An individual stays in A if and only if
R ()  0; (6)
and therefore leaves A if and only if R () < 0:When

 2 ;  : (6) binding	 is non-empty, we
call  its inmum.
A citizen is dened as an individual born in A; so all individuals have A0s citizenship. Individ-
uals are committed to working in the country where they live. Since the focus is on emigration of
highly skilled individuals, we consider that there is a partition of citizens between A and B; with
the low-skilled individuals being in A: In addition, emigration of a set of individuals of measure
zero does not capture any economic phenomenon, so we assume that As resident population is
compact.
Assumption 4. A0s resident population is a closed interval of types
h
; bi ; with b 2 ;  :
We consider that As government is not able to levy taxes in B; since the scal prerogative
is closely linked to national sovereignty, and not willing to redistribute income to the individuals
staying in B: Consequently, T : T ! R with T =
h
; bi 0; l : Since T := zA xA; a tax policy
is budget balanced if and only if it satises the tax revenue constraint
Z b

(zA   xA) dF ()  0: (TR)
In the rest of the paper, we denote by  the Lagrange multiplier associated with (TR).
2.3. Social Criteria
As government is a benevolent policy maker which intends to implement the tax policy corre-
sponding to the best compromise between equity and e¢ ciency. Its desire to redistribute income
is captured through its aversion to income inequality  2 R+: A zero aversion corresponds to
utilitarianism and an innite one to the Rawlsian maximin.
The social objective is more di¢ cult to specify than in closed economy. Indeed, it does not
only depend on  which is captured through an isoelastic function dened by  : R++ ! R;
 (U) = U
1 = (1  ) for  6= 1 and 1 (U) = lnU for  = 1; but also on the answers to the
following questions. First, should we maximize total or average social welfare? We consider that
the government is interested in social welfare per capita because we want to be able to compare
allocations di¤ering in population size. Second, who are the agents whose welfare is to count?
At least three social criteria can be proposed, each of which corresponds to a specic answer.
Under the National criterion, A0s government cares about the welfare of all its citizens and
wants each citizen to choose to stay in A. The social objective is
WNA; :=
Z b

 (VA ()) dF () and b = : (7)
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This objective corresponds to the mercantilist idea, formulated by Bodin (1578), that "the only
source of welfare is mankind itself". Emigration should therefore be prevented to keep the state
prosperous.
Under the Citizen criterion, A0s government cares about the average social welfare of its
citizens, whether they are in A or B. Under Assumption 4, the social objective is
WCA;
b := Z b

 (VA ()) dF () +
Z 
b  (VB ()  c ()) dF () : (8)
This criterion rests on the idea that the scal system nds its legitimacy in its democratic
adoption. Consequently, the welfare of every individual who has the right to vote should be
taken into account, irrespective of his country of residence6 . When this objective is chosen, the
optimal tax function depends on the choice of b and determines an allocation of As citizens
between A and B: Hence, As resident population is endogenous while the set of agents the
welfare of whom matters is exogenously xed.
Under the Resident criterion, As government cares about the average social welfare of its
residents. Under Assumption 4, the social objective is
WRA;
b := 1
F
b
Z b

 (VA ()) dF () : (9)
This criterion is based on the idea that a public policy should take the welfare of all taxpayers
into account. Consequently, the welfare of the citizens living in B does not count. When this
objective is chosen, the tax function as well as the set of agents who welfare is to count depend on
the choice of b7 . WA; R b is based on average utilitarianism, which is known to face the Mere
Addition Paradox: the addition of individuals whose utility is less than the average utility in the
initial population is regarded as suboptimal even if this change in population size a¤ect no one
else and does not involve social injustice. However, this paradox is not a matter herein because
we are focusing on emigration of the highest skilled individuals initially living in A; whose utility
will be shown to be greater than average utility in A.
3. FIRST-BEST OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
This section characterizes the rst-best optimal allocations where each individuals productivity
is public information. Consequently, As government implements a tax policy depending on
productivity, i.e. T (; l) = T () :We restrict attention to the tax schedules which are continuous
6 In France, the 14th Article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which has constitutional
value, provides that: "All citizens have the right to vote, by themselves or through their representatives, for the
need for the public contribution, to agree to it voluntarily, to allow implementation of it, and to determine its
appropriation, the amount of assessment, its collection and its duration". For example, twelve senators represent
the French citizens living abroad.
7 In other words, a population problem consisting in "di¤ erent number choices" (Part, 1984) is embedded in
the optimal income tax problem.
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and di¤erentiable almost everywhere.
The indirect utility if A were a closed economy, V clA () ; is used as a benchmark. When  is
nite, it is decreasing in  at the social optimum (Mirrlees, 1974): there is therefore a curse of
the highly skilled workers. When  is innite, all individuals receive the same utility level. In this
section, we assume V clA
 


< VB
 

   c   since otherwise the participation constraints would
never be active.
3.1. National criterion
As government chooses the tax paid by each individual or, equivalently, the consumption-labour
bundle intended for each individual.
Problem 1 (National Criterion, First-Best). Find (x; l) 2 X to maximize WNA;; with b = ;
subject to
R ()  0 for   b (PC)
and (TR).
Proposition 1 (The Curse of the Middle-Skilled).  exists and the participation constraints
are binding above it. When  <1, the optimum indirect utility in A is V-shaped in ; minimum
at : When !1, the optimum indirect utility in A is constant up to  and then increasing.
Proof. See A.1 in the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. On panel (a), the governments aversion to income inequal-
ity is nite. The -individuals are the worse-o¤ when potential mobility is taken into account.
On panel (b), the government is Rawlsian. The utility levels of the individuals with productivity
below  are reduced compared to the closed economy.
The participation constraints (PC) separate the population into two intervals: they are in-
active below  and active above. Consequently, it is no longer possible to require the most
talented individuals to work as much as without mobility, i.e. to require them to keep working
even though labour disutility exceeds the gains from the increase in income. The productive rent
is thus extracted to the maximum from the most productive individuals among those threatening
to emigrate. Redistribution in A is reduced and the situation of the low-skilled individuals gets
worse.
It is therefore from the most productive individuals among those insu¢ ciently talented to
threaten to leave the country that the productive rent is extracted to the maximum. However,
this rent cannot be extracted at will because of the participation constraints. Redistribution in
A is thus reduced and the situation of the low-skilled individuals deteriorates.
3.2. Citizen and Resident Criteria
We examine if it is socially optimal to prevent emigration of the highly skilled individuals under
the Citizen and Resident criteria.
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Figure 1: The curse of the middle-skilled workers
Problem 2 (Citizen and Resident Criteria, First-Best). Find (x; l) 2 X and b 2 ;  to
maximize W iA;
b ; i = fC;Rg ; subject to (PC) and (TR).
Proposition 2. Under the Citizen and Resident criteria, the optimal tax policy is the same as
that chosen under the National criterion.
Proof. See A.1 in the Appendix.
The avour of the proof is as follows. Let b <  be socially optimal. The individuals with
productivity b are indi¤erent between A and B; i.e. Rb = 0; and those with productivity
greater than b emigrate to B: Note that it is always feasible to make the latter relocate to A;
without reducing the indirect utilities of As residents, in giving them their laissez-faire utility
VB (or a bit more than their reservation utility). We show in the Appendix that the laissez-
faire utility of individuals with productivity  > b is greater than the average utility of A0s
resident population. This feasible change increases social welfare, which contradicts the premise.
The social optimum corresponds therefore to the corner solution as regards the allocation of
individuals between A and B:
4. SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
The distribution of characteristics in the economy remains common knowledge, but individual
productivity is now private information. As government is thus restricted to setting taxes as
a function of earnings, i.e. T (; l) = T (z) : Hence, it has to ensure that the tax schedule is
incentive compatible.
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4.1. Statement of the Problem
T is an incentive compatible tax schedule if and only if individuals living in A have an incentive
to reveal their type truthfully when it is implemented. By the revelation principle, the incentive
compatibility conditions read
u (xA (
0) ; zA (0) ; )  u (xA () ; zA () ; ) for all (; 0) 2
h
; bi2 : (IC)
To deal with this uncountable innity of constraints, the Spence-Mirrlees property is assumed
to hold:
Assumption 5 (Single-Crossing). s0 (xA () ; zA () ; ) < 0:
Under Assumption 5, (IC) is equivalent to:
V 0A () =  
zA ()

u0z (xA () ; zA () ; ) for   b; (FOIC)
zA () non-decreasing for   b: (SOIC)
The proof of this equivalence is standard and is omitted. (FOIC) is an envelope condition
specifying how the indirect utility VA must locally change. Since V 0A  0, VA cannot be V -
shaped. (SOIC) is a global monotonicity condition of gross income.
(SOIC) implies that the most general class of direct revelation mechanisms (xA; zA) to con-
sider is the class of almost everywhere di¤erentiable functions. Here, we restrict the analysis to
the class of functions which are continuous and piecewise di¤erentiable. Hence, we look for the
optimal tax function among the admissible functions which are continuous but can exhibit kinks
at a nite number of points corresponding to jumps of the marginal tax rate. Consequently,
(SOIC) is equivalent to
z0A ()  0 for   b: (SOIC)
In addition R () is continuous. This implies that  is actually the minimum productivity level
at which individuals threaten to emigrate and that the b-individuals are indi¤erent between
living in A or in B provided b 2  ;  :
Since As government does not know who are the agents for whom the location rent R () is
zero, the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility conditions have to be taken
simultaneously into account for all As residents8 . The second-best optimal non-linear income
tax problems read thus as follows.
Problem 3 (Second-Best). Find T (zA) to maximizeW iA;; i = fN;C;Rg ; subject to (i) (FOIC),
(SOIC), (PC), (TR); (ii) b =  when i = N and b 2 ;  otherwise.
8 If the participation constraints (PC) were not type-dependent, it would be necessary and su¢ cient to check
that they are satised at  since (FOIC) ensures that the optimal utility path is non-decreasing.
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There are three main di¢ culties compared to the closed-economy analogue problem. First,
(PC) can a priori bind on any subset of the resident population, even at isolated points, because
R () is not necessarily monotonic. Second, (PC) are pure state constraints in the optimization
problems. The adjoint variables may thus have jump discontinuities. Third, under the Citizen
and Resident criteria, b is free to vary between  and :
In solving Problem 3, we assume that the adjoint variables have a nite number of jump
discontinuities and are C1 elsewhere. This ensures that the necessary conditions are equivalent
to the su¢ cient ones, under appropriate concavity restrictions. Without this assumption, it
would be very di¢ cult to say anything about the optimal tax schemes. For later reference, we
call  the adjoint variable associated with (FOIC) and 0  0 the Lagrange multiplier of (PC),
which corresponds to the shadow price of a marginal increase in the reservation utility at : Let
also
 () := 
 

  Z 

0 () d (10)
be the shadow price of a uniform marginal increase in the reservation utility for all 0  : The
function , with derivative 0 almost everywhere, is non-decreasing.
4.2. Optimal Tax Schedule for the Individuals Threatening to Emigrate
Before looking at a specic social criterion, we derive properties which are satised by all optimal
tax schemes for the individuals threatening to emigrate. The rst one deals with the sign of the
tax function.
Property 1. Let (PC) be active at : Then, T (zA ()) > 0:
It is always possible to levy taxes on the individuals who threaten to emigrate. Indeed,
let (PC) be active at some : Since c () > 0 under Assumption 3, VB () > VA () and thus
T (zA ()) > 0:
We now examine the case where the participation constraints are active on an interval of
positive length I  ; . By denition,
R ()  0 for  2 I: (11)
Consequently, V 0A () = V
0
B ()  c0 () for  2 I: Hence the rate of increase of the indirect utility
the government has to give to the individuals so that they reveal their private information, is
equal to the slope of the reservation utility on I. In addition, employing (FOIC) and rearranging
yield
zA () =   [V 0B ()  c0 ()] =u0z for  2 I; (12)
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and by di¤erentiation,
z0A () =
[V 0B ()  c0 ()]
n
 (u00xzx
0
A + u
00
z) 

1 + 
V 00B () c00()
V 0B() c0()

u0z
o
(u0z)
2    (V 0B ()  c0 ())u00zz
for  2 I: (13)
The second-order condition for incentive compatibility (SOIC) can only be satised on I if the
curly bracket in (13) is positive. It thus restricts the set of intervals where (PC) can be binding.
Property 2. (PC) can be active on an interval of positive length I only if
 (u00xzx
0
A + u
00
z)
u0z
 1 + V
00
B ()  c00 ()
V 0B ()  c0 ()
for  2 I: (14)
The elasticity of the marginal reservation utility, evaluated at , appears on the RHS. The
LHS captures the behavioural response of the -individuals to a slight change in their reservation
utility.
To have further insight, we turn to quasilinear-in-consumption preferences,
u (xA; zA; ) = xA   v (zA=) ; with v0 > 0 and v00 > 0: (15)
Since eH = v0= (lv00) ; u00xz = 0; u
00
z = (1 + lv
00=v0) v0=2 and u0z =  v0=; (14) reads
 1  1
eH ()
 1 + V
00
B ()  c00 ()
V 0B ()  c0 ()
;
the LHS of which is strictly negative.
Property 3. Let preferences be quasilinear in consumption and consider an interval of positive
length where (PC) is active. Then, there is no bunching on this interval when VB   c is convex.
When the elasticity of labour supply is constant (eH () = e); the disutility of labour can be
described by
v (l) = l1+1=e= (1 + 1=e) : (16)
Hence, VB () = 1+e= (1 + e) : The rst-order condition for individual utility maximization in
A yields lA () = e [1  T 0]e : In addition, by (12), lA () =  e1+e [e   c0 ()]
e
1+e : Using both
expressions of lA () and solving for T 0; one gets:
Property 4. Let preferences be quasilinear in consumption, e be the constant elasticity of labour
supply and I be an interval of positive length where (PC) is active. Then,
T 0 = 1    e1+e [e   c0 ()] 11+e for  2 I: (17)
In this case, the optimal marginal tax rates on I depends on the productivity level, on the
elasticity of labour supply and on the slope of the costs of migration. Their sign is as follows.
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Property 5. Consider the same situation as in Property 4. Then,
T 0 (zA ()) T 0, c0 () T 0 for all  2 I: (18)
When the costs of migration are non-increasing, the theorem stating that the optimal tax
function is strictly increasing at all income levels (Seade, 1982) does no longer hold. When the
costs of migration are strictly decreasing in productivity, the optimal marginal tax rates faced
by the individuals threatening to emigrate are strictly negative9 . This property contrasts with
two results obtained in closed economy, stating that: (i) the optimal marginal tax rates are
non-negative (Mirrlees, 1971); (ii) the optimal marginal tax rate is zero at the top (Sadka, 1976,
Seade, 1977). The next corollaries of Property 5 provide further details about these signicant
changes.
The rst one considers constant migration costs on I: Then, by Property 5, lA () = e on
I. In addition, VA = VB   c = 1+e= (1 + e)  c and, by (15), T = lA   VA   l1+1=eA = (1 + 1=e).
Consequently, T (zA ()) = c () on I:
Corollary 1. Consider the same situation as in Property 4 and let c0 () = 0 on I: Then, the
optimal tax function has a at section corresponding to potentially mobile individuals paying
taxes equal to their costs of migration.
Hence, because of the threat of migration, the optimal tax schedule becomes regressive: highly
skilled individuals for whom the participation constraints are binding pay less taxes in proportion
to gross income than lower skilled individuals. The situation is even more acute when the costs
of migration are strictly decreasing.
Corollary 2. Consider the same situation as in Property 4 and let c0 () < 0 on I: Then, the
optimal average tax rate and the optimal tax function are strictly decreasing in productivity on I:
Here, progressivity of the optimal tax schedule does not only collapse because of potential
mobility; the tax liability itself becomes strictly decreasing. This means that there are middle-
skilled individuals insu¢ ciently talented to leave the country which pay higher taxes than more
productive individuals. This is a second-best counterpart of the curse of the middle-skilled, in
which taxes replace utility levels.
4.3. National Criterion
We study the impact of the threat of migration on the optimum tax scheme in A when As
government adopts the National criterion. To this aim, Mirrleess formula is extended to the
case where agents are allowed to vote with their feet. This formula gives the optimal marginal
tax rates in the absence of bunching.
9An example of optimal income tax schedule with strictly negative marginal tax rates is provided in the
simulation section.
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4.3.1. A First Pass
We rst look at a very simple situation to illuminate the basic economic relations which determine
the optimal marginal tax rates10 . As government adopts the Rawlsian maximin and there
are agents with zero productivity ( = 0). The social objective is thus to maximize the social
benet given to the latter individuals. Preferences are quasilinear in consumption, which captures
the absence of income e¤ects on labour supply, and the elasticity of labour supply is constant
(eH () = e). Migration costs are constant, equal to c () = c. In addition, attention is restricted
to the cases where (PC) is only active on non-degenerate intervals; by Property 1, taxes paid by
individuals threatening to emigrate amount to c:
We adopt the methodology employed by Piketty (1997) and Saez (2001) to derive the optimal
marginal tax rates. We consider the e¤ects of a small increase dT in the optimal marginal tax
rates for income between z and z+ dz: This tax perturbation has three e¤ects on social welfare,
captured through changes in tax revenue G: The rst two e¤ects are the same as in a closed
economy. The third one is new.
Mechanical e¤ect: All individuals with income greater than z pay additional taxes dTdz:
Since their proportion is given by 1  F (z) ; the e¤ect on tax revenue is
dG+ = (1  F (z)) dTdz: (19)
Elasticity e¤ect: The net-of-tax wage rate of the individuals with income between zA and
zA + dzA decreases from z (1  T 0) to z (1  T 0   dT ) ; i.e. by dT= (1  T 0)%: The reduction
in gross income z for the f d individuals is therefore e dT= (1  T 0) z f d: This results in a
loss in tax revenue dG 1 = T
0  e  dT= (1  T 0)  zfd; since d = dz= [l (1 + e)] by denition
of e;
dG 1 =  
T 0
1  T 0
e
1 + e
 f  dTdz: (20)
Participation e¤ect: Individuals with income greater than z for whom (PC) is active have
to be compensated for the increase in taxes. Since preferences are quasilinear in consumption
and migration costs constant, an amount dTdz has to be given to them. Let f be a measure
generated by the density f on

; 

and PC be the productivity set where (PC) is active.
Provided (PC) is only active on non-degenerate intervals, the e¤ect on tax revenue is
dG 2 =  f
 
z; 
 \PC dTdz: (21)
At the social optimum, the small tax reform perturbation has no rst-order e¤ect. Conse-
quently dG+ + dG 1 + dG
 
2 = 0: Since z has been chosen arbitrarily, the following result is
obtained.
10The simplifying assumptions are made to get the avour of the result stated in Proposition 4 in the most
general case. In addition, optimal tax schemes satisfying all of them are shown to exist in the simulation section.
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Proposition 3. Assume (PC) is not active at isolated points. Then, when preferences are
quasilinear in consumption, eH () = e and c () = c; the Rawlsian optimal marginal tax rates
are given by
T 0
1  T 0 =

1 +
1
e

1  F ()
f ()
 
1  f
 
; 
 \PC
1  F ()
!
for  < ; (22)
and T 0 = 0 for  = ; provided there is no bunching at the optimum.
Proof. See A.2 in the Appendix for a formal proof.
When f
 
; 
 \PC = 0; (22) reduces to the formula derived by Piketty (1997) in closed
economy. Three points are worth noting. First, since eH is constant, it can be rewritten as
T 0
1  T 0 =
T 0cl
1  T 0cl
 
1  f
 
; 
 \PC
1  F ()
!
; (23)
where T 0cl is the Rawlsian marginal tax rate the -individuals would face in A in the absence
of individual mobility. As f
 
; 
 \PC  1   F () ; the marginal tax rates faced by all
individuals, and not only those of the individuals threatening to emigrate are reduced in the
presence of potential mobility11 . Second, f
 
; 
 \PC = (1  F ()) is increasing in  for
  : Hence, the closer  to ; the greater the reduction in marginal tax rates. Third,
if the participation constraints are active at any given  < ; T 0 (zA ()) = 0 by Property 4.
But, by (22), T 0 (zA ()) = 0 if and only if f
 
; 
 \PC = 1   F () ; that is if and only
if the participation constraints are active for all individuals with productivity greater than :
Consequently, the participation constraints separate the population into two intervals: they are
slack for  <  and binding for   :
4.3.2. The General Case
We extend the previous analysis by relaxing all simplifying assumptions, except the absence of
bunching.
Proposition 4. From the National criterion and in the absence of bunching, the optimal mar-
ginal tax rates are
T 0 (zA ())
1  T 0 (zA ()) = A ()B ()C () for  < ; (24)
11Hence, the taxes net of the social benet given to the worst-o¤ individuals T (zA ()) T (zA ()) are reduced
for everyone compared to the closed-economy ones.
16
where A () :=
1 + eM ()
eH ()
, C () :=
1  F ()
f ()
and B () := B1 () B2 () B3 () with
B1 () :=
1
1  F ()
Z 


1  
0
 (VA ())u
0
x (xA; zA; )


	dF () ;
B2 () :=
1
1  F ()
Z 

0 ()u0x (xA; zA; )

	d; 
0  0 (= 0 if R () > 0) ;
B3 () :=   1
1  F ()

 


u0x (xA; zA; )

; 
 

  0  = 0 if R   > 0 ;
where 	 = exp
Z 


1  e
M ()
eH ()

z0A ()
zA ()
d:
In addition,
T 0
 
zA
 


1  T 0  zA   = A
 


f
 

   u0x  xA; zA; 

 0  = 0 if R   > 0 (25)
and  > 0:
Proof. See A.2 in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 extends Mirrleess (1971) optimal income tax formula to take the threat of
migration into account, using behavioural elasticities as in Saez (2001). (24) reects the trade-
o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity when the government has decided to maintain the national
productive capacity to the maximum in preventing its citizens from leaving the country. A ()
and C () are the usual e¢ ciency and demographic factors, respectively. However, the value of
A () is usually not the same whether the individuals can or cannot vote with their feet since
it depends on gross income which is endogenous. The factor B () ; which combines e¢ ciency
and equity, is the only factor which does not write as in Mirrleess formula, in which the RHS of
(24) reduces to A ()B1 ()C (). As previously stated, the optimal marginal tax rates can be
strictly negative at the top, and therefore non-positive at interior points of the schedule.
Alternatively, B1 () B2 () can be written as
B1 () B2 () =
Z 

[1  g ()]	dF () ; (26)
where g () =
h
0(VA())
 +
0()
f()
i
u0x (xA; zA; ) is the social marginal weight of the -individuals
within the population. Higher social priority is thus given to the people threatening to emigrate.
Since the optimal marginal tax rate at  is inversely related to the aggregate social marginal
weights of the individuals with greater productivity, we expect individual mobility to decrease
the optimal marginal tax rates over a productivity range exceeding that where the participation
constraints are binding. We now turn to the di¤erent channels captured in Formula (24) to look
into this intuition.
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As previously, we consider a small tax reform perturbation around the optimal income tax
schedule. A small increase dT for gross income between z and z + dz has four e¤ects on social
welfare. Three e¤ects are already observed in closed economy and have been thoroughly examined
by Saez (2001).
 The three "usual" e¤ects allow us to grasp A () ; B1 () and C () :
First, the local increase in the marginal rate of tax mechanically results in individuals with
gross income greater than z paying additional taxes. Second, the elasticity response from the
taxpayers with gross income between z and z + dz decreases their labour supply and reduces
tax revenue. Third, under Assumption 2, the increase in taxes paid by these individuals has an
income e¤ect, leading them to work more, which is good for tax receipts.
 The new participation e¤ect illuminates B2 () and B3 () :
The tax reform perturbationmechanically results in an increase in taxes paid by all individuals
with gross income strictly above z. Consequently, those among them for whom the participation
constraints were already active receive now a utility level below their reservation utility. Then
the participation constraints (PC) are no longer satised. So, these individuals have to be
compensated for the increase in taxes they face. We rst examine the compensation for the
individuals whose gross income is strictly below z:
The substitution e¤ect leads As government to totally compensate them for staying in A:
Each of them is thus given u0x (xA; zA; )  dTdz additional units of utility. Since 0 () is the
shadow price of the participation constraint at  and  the Lagrange multiplier of the tax revenue
constraint (TR), the cost in terms of social welfare of the compensation of the  -individuals
amounts to
0 ()u0x (xA; zA; )

 dTdz: (27)
The substitution e¤ect combines with the usual income e¤ect. Since leisure is a normal good
under Assumption 2, the increase in the tax burden paid by all individuals with income greater
than z induces them to work more. This allows As government to increase the taxes they face.
As a result, it is not required to compensate the potentially mobile individuals as high as the
increase in taxes they face. We know from Saez (2001) that the magnitude of the uncompensated
behavioural response is summarized by 	  1; which converts the social marginal utility of
consumption of the  -individuals, u0x (xA; zA; ) ; into that of the z-individuals, u
0
x (xA; zA; z).
Using (27), the social cost of the compensation of the  -individuals, including income e¤ects, is
0 ()u0x (xA; zA; )

	  dTdz: (28)
Now, the overall social cost of compensating the individuals on the upper bound of the population
is directly obtained as
  @W
N
A;=@ (VB   c)



 dTdz: (29)
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When the participation constraints are active at ; @WNA;=@ (VB   c)


is equal to @WNA;=@VA


,
which is     : Converting (29) into social marginal utility of consumption at z; one gets

 


u0x (xA; zA; z)

 dTdz: (30)
Finally, by (28) and (30), the average social cost of the compensation of all potentially mobile
individuals with gross income above z is
1
1  F (z)
"Z 
z
0 ()u0x (xA; zA; )

	zd +

 


u0x (xA; zA; z)

#
 dTdz
= [B2 (z) +B3 (z)] dTdz: (31)
B2 (z) is positive as soon as there are individuals with productivity above z for whom the
participation constraints are binding. This term goes therefore against progressivity on a range
of gross income levels preceding that on which individuals hesitate to leave the country. This is
because increasing the marginal tax rates at  makes the compensation of all more productive
individuals threatening to emigrate more expensive in terms of social welfare. In addition, for
all  <  : 0 () = 0, so
B2 () =
1
1  F ()
Z 

0 ()u0x (xA; zA; )

	d: (32)
Di¤erentiating, one obtains
B02 () =
1  F ()
(1  F ())2 f ()B2 (
) ; (33)
which is strictly positive for   : the closer to  the productivity level at which the small
tax reform perturbation takes place, the higher the average compensation required to satisfy the
participation constraints. When  is greater than , it is not possible to determine the sign of
B2 () in the general case. Since B3 () is non-negative, it reinforces the decrease in marginal
tax rates induced by B2 () :
Eventually, the participation e¤ect results in the adjustment of the optimal marginal tax rates
to make the average tax rates compatible with the participation constraints. In consequence,
A0s government should be particularly cautious about increasing marginal tax rates even at
productivity levels where individuals do not hesitate to vote with their feet.
4.4. Citizen and Resident Criteria
Under the National criterion, the whole population is constrained to stay in A. We now relax this
constraint to examine whether keeping everybody in the country is not too expensive in terms
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of social welfare. For this purpose, we separate Problem 3 into two subproblems to determine
the optimal b. In the rst subproblem, b is arbitrarily chosen by As government.
Subproblem 1. Given b 2 ;  ; nd (xA; zA) to maximize W iA; b ; i = fC;Rg ; subject to
(FOIC); (SOIC 0); (PC); (TR):
Let WiA;
b be the social value function of this subproblem, ib () the shadow price of
(FOIC), and ib () the shadow price of a uniform marginal increase in the reservation utility for
all 0  . The solution in b to Problem 3 is then obtained as:
Subproblem 2. Find bi 2 ;  solution to maxb2[;]WiA; b ; i = fC;Rg :
Subproblem 1 is a generalization of the second-best National problem where the upper produc-
tivity in A is exogenously given. Consequently, the optimal marginal tax rates share qualitative
properties irrespective of the chosen social criterion. The only di¤erences come from changes in
the size of As resident population.
Property 6. Proposition 4 applies for the Citizen and Resident criteria provided:
(i)  is replaced by bi and 1  F () by F bi  F () ; i = fC;Rg ;
(ii) in B1 () ; 0 (VA) is divided by F
bR for the Resident criterion.
Proof. See A.3 in the Appendix.
In addition, we note that for all b 2 (; ); the b-individuals are indi¤erent between living in
A or B: By Property 1, they thus pay strictly positive taxes at the solution to Subproblem 1.
We are now prepared to examine the allocation of individuals between A and B resulting from
the implementation of the Citizen and Resident optimal income tax schedules. Let us assumeb < . Individuals with productivity above b are in B: Making them relocate to A has four
e¤ects. (i) It increases social welfare because they have utility levels above the average in As
resident population and 0 > 0. (ii) It increases tax receipts and thus social welfare because
strictly positive taxes can be levied on them since c > 0. (iii) It requires adjustments to prevents
them from imitating less productive individuals. (iv) It brings about a new upward mimicking
behaviour. Indeed, As residents can now have an incentive to mimicking them since they have
the most appealing outside options.
The last e¤ect is crucial to understanding the interactions between the incentive-compatibility
conditions and the type-dependent participation constraints. In closed economy, individuals have
the usual incentive to understate  to obtain greater social benet whilst enjoying more leisure12 .
When type-dependent participation constraints are taken into account, the individuals may also
be tempted to overstate  in working harder to obtain greater compensation for staying in
A: This behaviour reects countervailing incentives. An asymmetry in terms of informational
12 In the discrete population model of Guesnerie and Seade (1982), a su¢ cient condition for incentive-
compatibility of the tax scheme is that the downward self-selection constraints are binding, which corresponds to
a monotonic chain to the left (see also Weymark (1986, 1987)).
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constraints between the individuals with productivity below b and the b-individuals may therefore
arise. Indeed, contrary to the former, the latter can only have the usual incentives. The cost
of making the -individuals reveal their private information, represented by ib ()  0; can thus
have a downward jump discontinuity at b: However, making them reveal their private knowledge
requires the gap between VB
b   cb and VA () to be reduced. This increase in VA ()
reduces the social cost of a uniform increase in the reservation utility at  and above, which is
captured by  () : This e¤ect stops suddenly when  tends to b. Consequently, an upward jump
discontinuity in ib corresponds to the downward jump discontinuity in ib at b: It turns out that
these discontinuities have the same magnitude.
Property 7. At b;
ib
b   ib b = ib b  ib b   0= 0 if (PC) inactive at b ; (34)
where ib
b  := lim

<!b ib ().
Proof. See (77) in the Appendix.
We rst provide two su¢ cient conditions for such a discontinuity not to occur.
Property 8. If ib is continuous at b for all b 2 (; ] and if the -individuals pay strictly positive
taxes at the second-best National optimum, then bi = ; i = fC;Rg 13 :
Proof. See A.3 in the Appendix.
Property 9. If there is a non-empty interval containing b where (PC) is active at the solution
to Subproblem 1 for all b 2 (; ]; then bi = ; i = fC;Rg :
Proof. See A.3 in the Appendix.
These properties hold when the usual downward mimicking behaviour predominates for highly
skilled individuals. However, they do not exhaust all possible cases. Indeed, the trade-o¤between
maintaining national capacity to the maximum and sustaining the redistribution programme is
more complex when countervailing incentives prevail close to the top. In particular, there are
cases where it is optimal to implement an income tax schedule inducing emigration of its highly
skilled. A careful inspection of the National solution provides a su¢ cient condition.
Proposition 5. Consider the National optimal allocation and the corresponding
 
; ; ; T; VA;W
N
A;

.
Assume  is an isolated point where (PC) is active and  has a jump discontinuity. Then
(i) bC <  if
T (zA) f <
h



   i jR0j    V 0A; (35)
13T

zA



> 0 cannot be established in the general case. Besides, let  = 0 (Utilitarianism) and consider
quasilinear-in-consumption preferences. Then, the optimal second-best income tax policy in closed economy is
the laissez-faire and so V clA () = VB () : Since c () > 0; the National second-best optimal allocation is also the
laissez-faire and thus T

zA



= 0:
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(ii) bR <  if
T (zA) f +

 (VB   c) WNA;

f <
h



   i jR0j    V 0A; (36)
where all functions are evaluated at  except otherwise stated.
Proof. See A.3 in the Appendix.
Here, it should be kept in mind that the individuals to the very left of  have utility above
their reservation utility because  is an isolated point where (PC) is active. Since (PC) is active
at ; this implies that VB   c is steeper than VA at this point, i.e. R0
 


< 0: Individuals to the
very left of  are therefore left with a location rent at the margin.
(35) and (36) reect the marginal cost-benet analysis of the presence in A of the most produc-
tive individuals. By property 1, the -individuals pay positive taxes T
 
zA
 


. Since their pro-
portion is represented by f
 


and  is the unit of count in welfare, these taxes increase social wel-
fare by T
 
zA
 


f
 


. In addition, under the Resident criterion, the -individuals have util-
ity above the average in A; which rises social welfare by


 
VB
 

  c   WNA;   f   :
These positive marginal e¤ects appear on the LHSs.
The RHSs capture the marginal costs and benets with regard to incentives of the presence in
A of the -individuals. First, there is a cost due to countervailing incentives. Indeed, individuals
to the very left of  have the possibility to mimic the -individuals to benet from their higher
outside options. They can therefore claim an increase in their utility at the margin, equal to
V 0B
 

   c0     V 0A   = R0   : The shadow price of this behaviour is given by the excess
of 


 
over 
 


; which is positive by Property 7. The corresponding marginal social cost is
thus h



     i R0   > 0: (37)
(37) would vanish if  were not a non-isolated point where (PC) is active since, in this case,
R0
 


= 0:
Hence, because of countervailing incentives, the individuals to the very left of  have greater
utility. They thus are less inclined to mimic less productive individuals. The slope of the indirect
utility V 0A at  required for them to reveal their type truthfully is therefore reduced at the margin.
Since 


 
is the shadow price of (FOIC), the marginal social benet of this slackening of the
downward incentive compatibility constraints is 


 
V 0A: Here appears the second impact of
countervailing incentives due to the presence in A of the most productive individuals. Finally,
the net marginal social cost of countervailing incentives amounts toh



     i R0     V 0A   : (38)
The choice of b by As government can thus be regarded as a means of revealing private
information. Indeed, if As government designs a tax policy such that the individuals with
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productivity greater than b do not receive in A their reservation utility, it knows that b is the
maximum productivity in its resident population and consequently that the individuals with
productivity greater than b are in B: Proposition 5 tells us in which cases using this means
improves social welfare.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We already know that individual mobility is harmful to progressivity and signicantly alters the
qualitative properties of the optimal non-linear income tax schedule. It remains to quantify the
magnitude of the changes with respect to the Mirrleesian closed economy model. In particular,
we would like to examine whether potential mobility of a few highly skilled individuals has more
than a negligible e¤ect on the optimal policy. For this purpose, we adopt the National criterion
and calibrate As economy to roughly correspond to the French one.
5.1. Calibration
We employ a truncated lognormal distribution for the lower part of the productivity distribution
and complete it with a Pareto tail with density f () = K=1+a. The two parameters of the
lognormal distribution are estimated on the French survey data "Budget des familles", year
1995, as portrayed in Figure 4 in Laslier et al. (2003). We get a mean of 0.2398 and a variance
of 0.440314 . Following Hungerbühler et al. (2005), we take a = 2; choose K and the boundary
between both distributions in such a way that the entire distribution is continuously di¤erentiable.
We normalize the productivity levels so that the median individuals have productivity equal to
the median income in 1995; i.e. 13 320 euros. The productivity support is the positive real line
with an upper bound equal to 15 times the median productivity.
We focus on the case where there are no income e¤ects on labour supply and eH is constant,
with eH = 0:2, as in dAutume (2000). Preferences are thus given by (15) and (16). For
convenience, the government is assumed to be Rawlsian.
Migration costs are the new ingredient of our model. They correspond to all the costs an
individual will have to pay because of his choice of migration. Since the model is static, these
costs as well as the utility levels should be regarded as expected values. Very few empirical
work have studied the individual costs of migration15 . We use constant costs as a benchmark
and calibrate them so as to reect plausible scenarios as regards the proportion of individuals
threatening to emigrate: 10%; 5%, 3%; 1%, 0:5% and 0:1%: We obtain migration costs equal
to 15 550; 27 900; 40 500; 77 400; 104 300 and 151 900 euros per annum respectively. We also
provide simulations for linearly decreasing costs. The highest skilled individuals have migration
costs equal to 40 500 and 77 400 euros, values used in the constant case. The costs are then
14Since our model does not take the family size into account, the population is restricted to single individuals.
15For instance, the IZA Database for Migration Literature provides 34 matches for "moving costs"
(http://www.iza.org/iza/en/webcontent/links/migration). These references are mainly theoretical or estimate
the macroeconomic costs of migration.
23
linearly adjusted to obtain threat of migration by 1% and 0:5% respectively.
5.2. Numerical Results
Figures 24 and Table 1 in Appendix A.4 contrast the second-best optimal allocations for con-
stant migration costs in the six scenarios described above. For instance, when 3% of the pop-
ulation threaten to emigrate, the social welfare, equal to the redistributive budget under the
maximin, is reduced by 5:8%: The individuals paying the maximum average tax have gross
income bzA = 70 834e/year. The optimal average tax rates are decreasing above this level,
even if the participation constraints are only active for individuals with gross income above
zA = 98 779e/year. The range of decrease corresponds to 4:4% of the population. Even if the
individual and social utility levels do only slightly vary compared to the benchmark, Figure 2
emphasizes that the changes in the tax schedule are very noticeable, even when the proportion
of potentially mobile individuals is very low.
Specically, even if the average tax rate prole is already single-peaked in closed-economy, the
corresponding graphs are far more hump-shaped when the threat of migration goes up (Figure
2.b). The lower bound bzA of the range of gross income from which the average tax rate is
decreasing (cf. the black circles) is smaller than the gross income zA from which the participation
constraints are active (cf. the squares). Interestingly, the smaller the proportion of the population
threatening to emigrate, the larger the gap between bzA and zA as well as the ratio
1 +
1  F  zA
1  F (bzA) : (39)
The latter is approximately equal to 1:26; 1:34; 1:47; 2; 2:6; 7 for potential emigration by 10%;
5%; 3%; 1%; 0:5%; and 0:1% of the population. In this respect, the threat of migration seems to
have a multiplicative power all the stronger as fewer people would like to emigrate. It is really
a feature that only simulations may reveal.
Figure 3 and 4 contrast the open and closed optimal allocations from a distributional point
of view16 . The highly skilled appear as the real winners, since they pay less taxes (Figure 3.a)
and have higher utility (Figure 3.c). The situation of the low-skilled does not worsen as much
as one could expect. Individuals with gross income close to bzA are actually the real losers in
terms of taxes. Nevertheless, they slightly benet from the openness of the economy in terms
of utility. In fact, the decline in marginal tax rates allow them to increase their gross and net
income su¢ ciently to overbalance the resulting loss in leisure (Figure 3.b). Consequently, the
deterioration of the middle-skilled workerssituation in terms of taxes does not translate into
losses in individual welfare as observed in the rst-best. In spite of this rather comforting result,
inequality of utilities deepens (Figure 4).
16The gross income received by the -individuals depends on the tax schedule itself. For instance, we have
represented the choice of the -individuals if the economy were closed by empty circles in Figure 2a. As a matter
of fact, the variation in taxes in Figure 3.a is not obtained as the di¤erence between taxes paid with and without
mobility for a given gross income that can be read in Figure 2.c.
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Figure 2: Constant Migration Costs. (a) Optimal Marginal Tax Rates; (b) Optimal Average Tax
Rates; (c) Optimal Taxes. The solid line refers to the closed economy benchmark. Otherwise,
the less dotted the line, the lower the threat of migration: 10%; 5%; 3%; 1%; 0.5% and 0.1%
respectively. Squares correspond to bzA; black circles to zA; empty circles to the choice the
-individuals would make if the economy were closed.
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Figure 3: Constant Migration Costs. Increase w.r.t closed economy benchmark: (a) Taxes; (b)
Consumption; (c) Utility. The less dotted the line, the lower the threat of migration: 10%; 5%;
3%; 1%; 0.5%, 0.1% respectively. Squares correspond to bzA; circles to zA.
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Figure 4: Constant Migration Costs. Lorenz Curves for the Indirect Utility Levels. The less
dotted the line, the lower the threat of migration: 10%; 5%; 3%; 1%; 0.5%, 0.1% respectively.
The solid line below the 45 -line pertains to the closed economy benchmark.
Figure 5: Decreasing Migration Costs. The dotted lines give the migration costs; the dashed
lines the optimal tax liabilities. The less dashed the latter, the greater the threat of migration:
(a) 0:5%; (b) 1%. Squares correspond to bzA; circles to zA: The solid line pertains to the closed
economy benchmark.
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Figure 5 provides examples of optimal tax schemes for decreasing migration costs17 . The tax
liabilities are hump-shaped so that the middle-skilled have actually to pay greater taxes than
the highly-skilled. In contrast to the case where c () is constant, people on their participation
constraints pay lower taxes than their migration costs. In the rst-best setting, they would be
taxed as high as their migration costs. Therefore, taking incentive compatibility into account
restricts the tax levy on the potentially mobile individuals.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a rst example of the introduction of type-dependent participation con-
straints in the optimal income tax framework. These constraints interact with the standard con-
straints in a non-trivial way and make the structure of the mimicking behaviour more complex
than in closed economy. Since they induce substantial changes, it might be worth introducing
them in other classic models of taxation theory, like those devoted to capital taxation.
In this extended framework, the issue of the optimal allocation of individuals between the
home country and abroad is embedded in the optimal income tax problem. Consequently, a new
trade-o¤ between maintaining the redistribution programme and preserving national productive
capacities adds to the traditional trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. In the rst-best, emi-
gration of highly skilled individuals should always be prevented to maximize social welfare. In
the second-best, this may be false because of countervailing incentives.
Key qualitative features of the optimal income tax policy obtained in closed economy do no
longer hold. The participation e¤ect does not only favour a decrease in the optimal marginal tax
rates; it can also make them strictly negative. Consequently, the optimal average tax rates as
well as the optimal tax liabilities can be decreasing. Numerical simulations show that the threat
of migration has a signicant impact even when the proportion of potentially mobile individuals
is very low. They also reveal that if the highly skilled are the real winners, the welfare of the low-
skilled is only slightly reduced because quite high taxes can still be levied on the middle-skilled.
Our qualitative and quantitative results convey a curse of the middle-skilled workers: this
curse is expressed in terms of utility in the rst-best, and in terms of average tax rates and tax
liabilities in the second-best.
The backbone of the analysis remains valid even when Bs government implements a non-
linear income tax policy, provided this policy is given. Consequently, the material of this paper
paves the way for deriving the reaction function of A to Bs tax policy and vice versa. It thus
provides the basic ingredients of a symmetric game on redistributive non-linear income taxes,
the solution of which is left for further research.
17Linearity in  does not imply linearity in zA; as shown by the dotted lines.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. First-Best
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 0 and  be the Lagrange multipliers of (PC) and (TR) respectively.
Under Assumption 1, the solution is interior and the SOC are satised. Hence, the necessary
and su¢ cient FOC are
 
0 + 
0U 0x =  and  0 + 0U 0l =  ; (40)
with
0  0; U (x; l)  VB + c  0; 0 [U (x; l)  VB + c] = 0; 8 2

; 

: (41)
Since 0 > 0; (40) and (41) implies  > 0: The following Lemma is admitted since its proof
parallels that given in Mirrlees (1974).
Lemma 1. Let J be a non-empty open interval where 0  0: Then for all  2 J; (i) V 0A () < 0
when  <1; (ii) V 0A () = 0 when !1.
Step 1: The existence of  is obvious. Indeed, since V clA
 


< VB
 

   c   ; the closed-
economy solution violates (6); so there are  such that 0 > 0 at the solution to Problem 1.
Step 2: 0 () > 0 for all  > .
By (40), 0 () = =U 0x   0; which implies under Assumption 1 and the continuity of T;
the continuity of 0. Assume 0 := min

 2 ;  : 0 () = 0	 exists. Then, by continuity
of 0; there exists 00 > 0 such that 0 = 0 on [0; 00]. By continuity of R; R (0) = 0: On
[0; 00] ; V 0A  0 by Lemma 1 and V 0B   c0 > 0 under Assumption 3. Then R < 0 for  2 (0; 00) ;
contradicting (PC). Hence, 0 does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 2. We denote by VA (; ) and 0 (; ) the values of VA () and 0 () for a
given :
(a) Citizen criterion. We proceed by contradiction. Assume b <  is optimal. It is possible
to give the -individuals, with  > b; their laissez-faire utility VB in A: Since c > 0 and 0 > 0;
we have  (VB   c) <  (VB) and thus
Z b

 (VA (:; )) dF +
Z 
b  (VB) dF >
Z b

 (VA (:; )) dF +
Z 
b  (VB   c) dF; (42)
the RHS of which is WCA;
b. But the allocation corresponding to the LHS of (42) is also
feasible. A contradiction.
(b) Resident criterion. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: 

VB
b >  (VA (; )) ; 8:
Assume VB
b  VA (;1) : Then, VB ()  VA (;1) ; 8  b; because V 0B > 0: As c > 0
and (41), 0 (;1) = 0; 8  b. Hence, by Lemma 1, VA (;1) = VA (;1) ; 8  b. One
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thus gets VB () < VA (;1) ; 8 < b; which contradicts the Pareto-e¢ ciency of the laissez-faire.
Consequently,
VB
b > VA (;1) : (43)
In addition, As government maximizes VA (; ) when !1: Hence,
VA (;1)  VA (; ) ; 8: (44)
By (43) and (44), VB
b > VA (; ) ; 8; which completes the step since 0 > 0:
Step 2: b =  at the optimum.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume b <  is optimal. Proposition 1 applies for the given b:
Hence,  (VA (; ))   (VA (; )) for all    < : By Step 1,


VB
b   (VA (; )) ; 8   < : (45)
In addition, since 0 > 0 and c > 0;


VB
b >  (VB ()  c ()) ; 8 <   b: (46)
Using (45), (46), and VA = VB   c; 8 > ; we deduce:
1
F
b
Z b

 (VA (; )) dF () < 

VB
b ; (47)
the LHS of which isWRA;
b : It is always feasible to give the -individuals with  > b the utility
VB () > VB
b. A contradiction.
A.2. Second-Best: National Criterion
Proof of Proposition 3. Since VA = lA   T   v (lA) ; by 15, the government chooses lA and VA
to maximize Z 

[lA ()  VA ()  v (lA ())] dF () s.t. (FOIC) and (PC).
lA is control variable; VA state variable with adjoint variable : The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
are
HN =

lA   VA   v (lA) +  lA

v0 (lA)

f; (48)
LN = HN + 0R:
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By Theorem 2 in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, p. 332-335)18 ;19 , necessary conditions are:
@HN=@lA = 0, (   v0) f + 

v0

+
lA

v00

= 0; (49)
@LN=@VA =  0 (), 0 () = f   0; (50)

 

  0  = 0 when R   > 0 ; (51)
 ()  0 (= 0 when R () > 0) ; (52)
0 ()  0; R ()  0; 0 ()R () = 0; (53)

 
 j
    +j  =   +j      j   0 (= 0 if R (j) > 0): (54)
Since v0= = 1  T 0 and eH () = v0= (lAv00) ; rearranging (49) yields
T 0
1  T 0 =  

f

1 +
1
eH ()

: (55)
Integration of (50) between  and  gives
 () = 
 

  Z 

0 () d = 
 

  Z 

[f   0] d =     1 + F () + Z 

0d; (56)
which is plugged into (55). The proof is completed in two steps.
Step 1:
R 

0d =
R
2[;]\PC f () d = f
 
; 
 \PC.
Consider any non-empty open interval in

; 

where 0 > 0. By Property 5, T 0 = 0. Hence, for
all  in this interval  () = 0 by (55) and thus 0 () = 0; so by (50), 0 () = f (). Since (PC)
is assumed not to be active at isolated points, the equality above is obtained.
Step 2: 
 


= 0:
If (PC) is inactive at ; 
 


= 0 because of (51). Otherwise, (PC) is active at  and, under
assumptions, there is " > 0 such that (PC) is active on I = (   ; ]. Since eH is constant, by
Property 5, T 0 = 0 on I: Hence, 
 


= 0 by (55).
Proof of Proposition 4. zA is control variable; VA and G () :=
R 

T (zA ()) dF () are state
variables. Since T := zA xA; Leibnitzs rule yields G0 () = (zA ()  xA ()) f () : The isoperi-
metric constraint (TR) is taken into account through G0 and the boundary conditions G () = 0
and G
 


= 0: It is not necessary to take xA explicitly into account because it is uniquely de-
termined by VA and zA: Denote xA = h (VA; zA; ); di¤erentiating shows @xA=@VA = 1=u0x and
18The Theorem we referred to is applied as follows. Since the adjoint variables are assumed to have a nite
number of jump discontinuities and be C1 elsewhere, the "almost necessary conditions" (p. 335) are in fact
necessary. In the Theorem, q0 =  is our 0. Hence, q is our  and  our 0: Consequently, their k =


+k

  

 k

. We then employ their Eq. (5.37) to get (54).
19The necessary conditions are often stated for state variables which are xed at the initial point, which is not
the case presently. We have used Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, Theorem 5, pp. 185, Eq. 30b) (referred to as
(S-S) from now on) to obtain (52). This remark applies to the other proofs in the paper.
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@xA=@zA = s. The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are respectively
HN =  (VA) f + u
0
 +  (zA   xA) f;
LN = HN + 0R:
We call fjgNj=1 points where (6) becomes or ceases to be active as well as  and . As @u0=@zA =
u00z + su
00
x =  u0xs0, and @u0=@VA = u00x=u0x; necessary conditions are:
@HN=@zA = 0, u0xs0    (1  s) f = 0; (57)
@LN=@VA =  0 , 0 () =  0 (VA) f   u00x=u0x   0 + f=u0x; (58)
@LN=@G =  0 , 0 = 0; (59)
(51); (52) ; (53); (54) : (60)
 () is constant, equal to  > 0. As s = 1   T 0; T 0 = u0xs0= (f) by (57). In addition, using
basic calculus,

1 + eM ()

=eH () =  s0=s: Hence,
T 0
1  T 0 =  
u0x
f
1 + eM ()
eH ()
: (61)
When  = ; (61) and (51) yield (25). When  < ; (61) can be rewritten as
T 0
1  T 0 =  
u0x
 (1  F ())
1 + eM ()
eH ()
1  F ()
f ()
; (62)
If (:; ) means evaluation at (xA () ; zA () ; ) ; integrating (58) between  and  yields
 () = 
 


+
Z 


0 (VA ()) f () + 
0 ()  f ()
u0x (:; )
 e	d; (63)
with e	 := exp R  u00x (:;  0) =u0x (:;  0) d 0: The following relation has been proved by Saez (2001,
p. 227):
	 :=
u0x (:; )
u0x (:; )
e	 = expZ 


1  e
M ( 0)
eH ( 0)

z0A (
0)
zA ( 0)
d 0: (64)
Using (63) and (64),
   ()u
0
x (:; )

=
Z 


1 

0 (VA ()) +
0 ()
f ()

u0x (:; )


	dF () 

 


u0x (:; )

; (65)
and plug the obtained expression in (62).
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A.3. Second-Best: Citizen and Resident Criteria
Proof of Property 6. (a) Citizen criterion. By denition, WCA;
b is maximum when b = bC ;
i.e. when WCA;
bC is maximized with respect to (xA; zA) subject to (FOIC), (PC), (TR). The
FOC are the same as (57)(60), except that  is replaced by bC :We then proceed as in the proof
of Proposition 4.
(b) Resident criterion. By denition, WRA;
b is maximum when b = bR; i.e. when WRA; bR
is maximized with respect to (xA; zA) subject to (FOIC), (PC), (TR). The FOC are the same
as (57)(60), except that (i)  is replaced by bR and (ii) 0 (VA) is divided by F bR. We then
proceed as in the proof of Proposition 4.
We introduce the following denition and prove a lemma to establish Properties 89 and
Proposition 5.
Denition 1. (i) Consider the Citizen criterion and an allocation solution to Subproblem 1.
Then,
#C
b = T (zA) f + [ (VA)   (VB   c)] f + b V 0A + hb   iR0: (66)
(ii) Consider the Resident criterion and an allocation solution to Subproblem 1. Then,
#R
b = T (zA) f +  (VA) WRA; f + b V 0A + hb   iR0; (67)
In (66) and (67), all functions are evaluated at b except otherwise stated.
Lemma 2. For i = fC;Rg ; (i) (#i
b > 0; 8b > )) bi = ; (ii) #i   < 0) bi < :
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We rst state necessary conditions for a maximum in Subproblem 1. These conditions are
the same under the National and Resident criteria since b is given. A := z0A is control variable;
zA, VA and G are state variables; ,  and  are adjoint variables. (SOIC) is transformed into
g (A)  0 to avoid dealing with singular solutions, where g is a C2-function such that g0 > 0 and
g (0) = 0: The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are
Hi =  (VA) f + A + u
0
 +  (zA   xA) f;
Li = HR + 0R+ g (A) ;
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with i = fN;Rg : A solution to Subproblem 1 must satisfy:
@Li=@A = 0,  + g0 (A) = 0; (68)
0 =  @Li=@zA , 0 = u0xs0    (1  s) f; (69)
0 =  @Li=@VA , 0 =  0f   u00x=u0x + f=u0x   0; (70)
0 =  @Li=@G, 0 = 0; (71)
0  0; R  0; 0R = 0; (72)
  0; g (A)  0; g (A) = 0; (73)
 () = 
b = 0; (74)
 ()  0 (= 0 if R () > 0) ; (75)

b  0 = 0 if Rb > 0 ; (76)

 
 j
    +j  =   +j      j   (= 0 if R (j) > 0) : (77)
 is continuous (see Eq. (75), p. 375, in S-S). We check that  > 0: In addition, by continuity of
 and (74),

b  A b =  b A b = 0: (78)
Step 2: We now turn to Subproblem 2. By Leibnitzs rule,
@WCA;
b =@b = @
@b
"Z b

 (VA) dF ()
#
  

VB
b  cb f b ; (79)
@WRA;
b =@b = 1
F
b
"
@
@b
Z b

 (VA) dF ()
#
 
f
b
F
bWRA;
b : (80)
Eq. (79), p. 376, in (S-S) gives the value of the square brackets on the RHSs of (79) and (80):
H
b + h b   b iR0 b : (81)
Using the continuity of xA; zA; f , VA; (78), (77) and T = zA xA; (79) and (80) reduce to (66) and
(67) respectively. Therefore #i
b are nothing but the variation in social welfare @WiA; b =@b
resulting from a small increase in the upper productivity level in A: Consequently,
#i
b > 0; 8b   ) bi = ; (82)
#i
 


< 0) bi < : (83)
To complete the proof, note that bi =  is ruled out since c > 0 and the laissez-faire is always
implementable.
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Proof of Property 8. We establish that (i) in Lemma 2 holds under the present assumptions. (a)
Since  is continuous at b; b  = b  0 by (76). Hence, the last terms of (67) and (66)
are nil. By (FOIC), 
b V 0A b  0: (b) In addition, T zA b > 0: Under the Resident
criterion,  (VA) WRA;  0: Indeed, as 0 > 0; (FOIC) yields:


VA
b  1
F
b
Z b

 (VA) dF ()  WRA;
b : (84)
Under the Citizen criterion, R ()  0 for   b; and thus  VA b   VB b  cb :
Finally, #i
b > 0 for all b > :
Proof of Property 9. For any b; R = 0 on an interval of positive length hb   "; bi. Hence R0 = 0
at b. We then use the arguments in (b) in the proof of Property 8.
Proof of Proposition 5. We use (ii) in Lemma 2 and replace WRA;
 


by WNA;. R
0 < 0 because
 is an isolated point where (PC) is active.
A.4. Simulations
We use su¢ cient conditions to construct optimal tax schedule. These conditions are equivalent
to the necessary ones, provided concavity restrictions are added. By S-S (Theorem 1, p. 317-318),
they read:
(49)  (54) ; (85)
z0A  0; (86)
HN concave in lA and in VA; R quasiconcave in VA; (87)
where HN is dened by (48).
Our strategy is to look for candidate schedules for which  is continuous and z0A  0; without
taking (86) explicitly into account. By (55) and (56), these candidates are such that:
T 0
1  T 0 =

1 +
1
e

1
f
 
1  F () 
Z 

0 () d     ! and 0 = f   0: (88)
If they satisfy all other su¢ cient conditions, they are then optimal.
We start by noting that conditions (87) always hold. Indeed, quasiconcavity of R is direct.
HN is concave in VA as @2HN=@V 2A = 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating (49) and using (55), one gets:
@2H
@l2A
=  1
e
l
1=e 1
A f

1  
f

1 +
1
e

=  1
e
l
1=e 1
A f
T 0
1  T 0  0: (89)
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Concavity of H in lA is obtained since T 0 = 1  s < 1:
We now turn to the computational procedure. We make the guess that  is such that 0 > 0
for all  >  at the optimal solution and look therefore for candidates having this property.
We start by choosing a value for : We use VA = zA   T (zA)   v (zA=), (FOIC) and (6)
to derive zA and T (zA) for   . We compute T 0 (zA) = (dT 0=d) =z0A () for   : By (88),

 


and
R 

0 () d are equal to

 


=   T
0  zA  
1  T 0  zA   e1 + ef   ; (90)Z 

0 () d = 1  F ()  e
1 + e
f ()
T 0 (zA ())
1  T 0 (zA ())   
 


: (91)
For    < ; we compute ; derive 0 and get 0 = f   0. For  < ; T 0 are obtained from
(88). We then compute lA: Since
VA () = VA () +
Z 

l
1+1=e
A () =d (92)
by integration of (FOIC) and T (lA) = lA   v (lA)  VA; we have:Z 

T (zA) fd =
Z 

"
lA   v (lA)  VA () 
Z 

l
1+1=e
A ()

d
#
fd;
which leads to
VA () =
Z 

"
lAf   (1  F ()) l
1+1=e
A

  l
1+1=e
A
1 + 1=e
f
#
d (93)
by (TR) and Fubinis theorem. VA () is then obtained from (92)(93). We check that VA > VB c
for  < , VA () = VB ()  c () for   , and z0A  0: If it is the case, the candidate schedule
is an optimal one.
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